

25 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Andrew Marshall

SUBJECT: Proposed Changes to your 24 April Draft Crisis Study Report

1. The draft recommendations imply an orderliness in the policymaking process which is not likely to exist. My proposed changes seek to accommodate to this and to give the DCI somewhat more leeway in deciding how we would respond to the NSCIC guidance. Some of my changes are merely editorial.

2. Reference page 3, 1st six lines, amend as follows:

"-Reduces resources available for the production of more analytic and estimative intelligence, ~~which is reduced to a trickle of isolated reports.~~" ✓

"~~These reports and other~~ Cuts analytical reporting and key intelligence judgments to a trickle which tends have a tendency to get lost in the voluminous daily flow of current intelligence reporting." ✓

3. Reference page, 3, 4th lines from bottom, amend as follows:

"current reporting products has been ~~referred to repeatedly~~ emphasized above." ✓

4. Reference opening paragraph of "Recommended action," delete and substitute as follows after second sentence :

"A guiding principle in this design is the pinpointing of DCI responsibilities for certain intelligence functions and actions particularly related to crisis situations. Specific proposals are made for establishment of liaison relationships with high level consumers of intelligence, for changes in the input of current and estimative products dealing with a crisis, for the monitorship of the entire flow of guidance and products in crisis situations, and for immediate after-the-event assessments of intelligence performance in a crisis situation."

5. Reference Recommended Action 1, delete and substitute:

"1. Establishment of arrangements for intelligence liaison with policymakers and their staffs

While liaison arrangements between intelligence organization and policymakers have a continuing importance, the effective

functioning of such liaison can be of critical significance in crisis situations. A senior representative of the DCI should be assigned responsibility for maintaining continuous contact with NSC organizations and the NSC staff to identify their needs for intelligence and to communicate these to intelligence producers. It will be important, also, in crisis situations that designated senior officials of INR/State and DIA keep the DCI liaison officer informed as to identified needs of State and Defense Department policymakers. During a crisis period, the DCI's NSC liaison officer should be unencumbered by assignments not related to the crisis and should be assisted by staff support, including specialists on the region in which the crisis is centered, in executing his responsibilities:

--Acting as an observer at the WSAG and similar meetings and maintaining contact with policy staffs in order to identify intelligence needs.

--Passing these needs to intelligence producers, including straightforward requesting of information, preparing at his initiative or upon direction the terms of reference for more estimative and analytical pieces, and providing producers a sense of the major issues as seen by policymakers.

"In future crises the problem of determining consumer needs will persist. Policymakers will be too busy to provide much more explicit guidance than has been given in the past. The DCI representative would serve as a clearly identifiable link between the NSC organizations and staff and the intelligence producers."

(LAST SEVEN LINES OF THIS PARAGRAPH UNCHANGED)

6. Reference Recommended Action 2, amend as follows:

"The DCI should provide ~~at various points in time~~ a periodic interagency update on the current situation in a crisis area. This report would not be an analytical or estimative piece, but a summary of the military and political events which had occurred. Essential to the report would be that its focus cover all aspects of the crisis and ~~that a single~~ during the stated time period ~~be covered~~. While the frequency of publication would vary according to the intensity of the crisis, these summaries ~~would as a rule~~ could be provided to policymakers and their staffs on an 8-hour, 12-hour or 24-hour basis to insure availability of a current report before major meetings and before evaluations of major policy options. The DCI would be responsible for report preparation and for presenting the data in the most usable form. Observations, interpretations, and conflicting viewpoints would be clearly identified.

"Some confusion has resulted in the past among policymakers and their staffs over the progression of events in a crisis area. While several intelligence producers provide current reports to policy levels, each agency tends to concentrate in his its own area of expertise and to cover different time periods. The policy process would be more adequately supported if a joint report were released periodically which covered all functional areas (military, political, economic) for the same time period. Decisionmakers would then be uniformly aware of the status of the situation when engaging in discussions or examining options. The To prepare this product the DCI could constitute a joint task force or request other agencies to provide inputs to the-GIA's-Task-Force his CIA staff. Some doubt exists as to the effectiveness of either approach since the timely quality of data may be lost in the preparation of a composite report. Taking full advantage of available equipments and techniques for secure, near real time interagency communication for coordination purposes could alleviate this problem. An alternative technique would be for the DCI to instruct agencies to provide to policymakers periodic individual updates current as of a fixed point in time."

7. Reference Recommended Action 3, amend the first of the listed "other actions" as follows:

"--The ONE process for producing SNIE's NIE's, of the new type as already directed by the DCI*, should be used with greater frequency."

8. Reference Recommended Action 4, amend as follows:

"THE DCI SHOULD DESIGNATE AN INDIVIDUAL TO MANAGE PROVIDE FOR SENIOR-LEVEL MONITORING OF THE FLOW OF PRODUCTS AND GUIDANCE DURING A CRISIS

"A senior officer An individual on the DCI's Staff should be responsible for managing overseeing on behalf of the DCI the overall process of intelligence support during a crisis. His responsibilities would include:

-- Monitoring the guidance provided to intelligence agencies by the DCI's liaison representative (Act on 1) and other sources.

*DCI criteria for the new NIE format are:

- Intended users will be NSC-level policymaking authorities;
- Topics will be limited to those of high policy concern;
- Exposition normally will be structured to illuminate policy issues and, when appropriate, to provide a basis for open to policy authorities;
- Brevity, with any required backup material published in separate annexes.

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-- Evaluating the flow of products to consumers for relevance to needs, timeliness, analytical quality and manner of presentation.

-- Advising the DCI on major intelligence issues, problems or conflicts which require his attention.

" A single management focal point at the management level is needed to monitor control the process of intelligence support to policy levels in a crisis situation and to advise the DCI whenever corrective action is indicated. ~~While-formally vested-in-the-DCI,-the-demands-on-his-time-are-too-great-to enable-him-to-keep-abreast-of-all-issues. The-individual who-is-assigned-these-tasks-should-not-be-an-analyst,-the same-person-who-coordinates-with-the-policy-level-or-the producer-of-intelligence-products--Combining-jobs-places-too great-a-burden-on-a-single-individual-and-makes-it-more difficult-for-him-to-maintain-an-objective-role-in controlling~~ The task should be assigned to someone who is not involved in either the production process or in policy level coordination or liaison and can concentrate on the task of monitoring and evaluating intelligence support."



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